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ABSTRACT
Modern, off-the-shelf smartphones provide a rich set of pos-
sible touchscreen interactions, but knowledge-based authen-
tication schemes still rely on simple digit or character input.
Previous studies examined the shortcomings of such schemes
based on unlock patterns, PINs, and passcodes.
In this paper, we propose to integrate pressure-sensitive
touchscreen interactions into knowledge-based authentica-
tion schemes. By adding a (practically) invisible, pressure-
sensitive component, users can select stronger PINs that are
harder to observe for a shoulder surfer. We conducted a
within-subjects design lab study (n = 50) to compare our
approach termed force-PINs with standard four-digit and
six-digit PINs regarding their usability performance and a
comprehensive security evaluation. In addition, we con-
ducted a field study that demonstrated lower authentica-
tion overhead. Finally, we found that force-PINs let users
select higher entropy PINs that are more resilient to shoul-
der surfing attacks with minimal impact on the usability
performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of pressure-sensitive touchscreens
(e. g., Apple recently introduced 3D Touch1), many new
kinds of user interaction for smartphones become possible
that could also be used to enhance existing authentication
schemes. The scientific community has already examined
the shortcomings of unlock patterns, PINs and passcodes [2,
16,19,25] and presented alternative authentication schemes.
However, none of the proposed systems has shown to be
capable of replacing passcodes and unlock patterns as means
of authentication. On the one hand, many approaches, e.g.,
[15, 17] rely on customized hardware that is not available
off the shelf and thus makes large-scale deployment infea-
sible. On the other hand, many alternative approaches,
e.g., [13, 23] are time-consuming and therefore increase the
1https://developer.apple.com/ios/3d-touch/
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of force-PINs: digits can ei-
ther be entered with shallow or deep pressure on a pressure-
sensitive touchscreen, enhancing the space of four-digit PINs
to 204 = 160, 000 by an invisible component. The user re-
ceives vibration feedback as soon as deep pressure is recog-
nized.
authentication overhead. As shown by Harbach et al. [19]
in a field study on smartphone unlocking behavior, (un-
)locking smartphones produces a significant task overhead.
This highlights the need for novel authentication methods
that perform equally fast as or even faster than currently
deployed systems in terms of authentication speed.
Recently, biometric approaches such as fingerprint sensors
and face recognition have found their way into the mobile
ecosystem. As with previous authentication methods, how-
ever, they have shown to be easy to break by attackers and
difficult to use for certain groups of users. For example,
Apple’s fingerprint sensor as found in some recent iPhone
models was soon hacked after being introduced [11] and ex-
cludes users with weak fingerprints (e. g., due to manual la-
bor). Furthermore, classic biometric methods and implicit
authentication based on user behavior still require users to
use a PIN for fallback authentication in case the primary
authentication methods fail. Bonneau et al. [8] presented a
benchmark to evaluate authentication schemes. Their eval-
uation shows that many schemes only offer minor improve-
ments over passwords (if any) and that many systems offer a
number of benefits in theory but show severe limitations in
practice. These observations highlight that it is still worth
focusing on improving knowledge-based authentication on
smartphones as no other authentication method has proven
to be as secure and usable as passwords.
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In this paper, we propose that device manufacturers inte-
grate pressure-sensitive touchscreen interactions available on
mobile and wearable devices into knowledge-based authenti-
cation schemes. Our goal is to improve PIN security by en-
hancing the password space without compromising usability
factors such as authentication time, error rate and memo-
rability. This approach enhances traditional four-digit or
six-digit PINs with tactile features using pressure-sensitive
touchscreens as found in modern consumer hardware. We
refer to these enhanced PINs as force-PINs and Figure 1
provides an overview of the proposed scheme.
In theory, force-PINs offer the benefit of a larger PIN
space by design. Hence they are more difficult for an at-
tacker to guess and are more resilient to shoulder-surfing at-
tacks due to the invisible pressure component. To estimate
the task overhead introduced by this security feature, we
present a comparative evaluation of force-PINs and standard
four-digit and six-digit PINs as currently deployed in mod-
ern smartphones. We conducted a lab study with n = 50
participants to compare four-digit force-PINs against four-
and six-digit standard PINs and performed a small shoulder-
surfing experiment.
We found that entering force-PINs is more time-consuming
than entering digit-only PINs. However, we also found that
the difference in authentication time between six-digit and
force-PINs was not statistically significant. The number of
both critical and standard errors were rather low for force-
PINs even though the participants from our lab study were
using force-PINs for the first time. According to our survey
results, the participants liked the invisible pressure compo-
nent as an additional security feature.
In a small shoulder-surfing experiment, we found that the
force component is more difficult for an attacker to observe:
none of the force-PINs entered while being observed by an
attacker was guessed correctly. However, the attackers were
able to guess some of the digit sequences correctly. We also
analyzed the user-chosen force patterns alongside with the
entered digits and found that users create higher entropy
PINs. In an additional field study, we collected evidence
on learning effects and showed that authentication time de-
creases with training.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are:
• We propose an enhancement to digit-only PINs with
an invisible force component via pressure-sensitive touch-
screens.
• We implemented a prototype of the proposed scheme
called force-PINs.
• We performed an evaluation of force-PINs, including a
lab study with 50 participants, a security evaluation,
and a field study with 10 participants.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
Section 2, we discuss related work and in Section 3, we in-
troduce the attacker model, the concept of force-PINs, and
describe the objectives of this work. Section 4 presents the
design and results of our lab study. In Section 5, we pro-
vide a security evalution and in Section 6.3, we present the
results of a field study to show learning effects of force-PINs
deployed in a real-world environment. Sections 7 and 9 dis-
cuss our work and its limitations and we conclude this paper
in Section 10.
2. RELATEDWORK
Given the importance and the practical impact, it is not
surprising that there has been a significant amount of work
on authentication schemes. In the following, we briefly re-
view work closely related to our approach. We also refer to
the work by Bonneau et al. [8], who presented a benchmark
for evaluating authentication schemes.
Malek et al. [24] proposed a haptic-based graphical pass-
word scheme. They complement graphical passwords with
personal entropies based on pressure and argue that the
password space is increased. However, they did not con-
duct a user study to evaluate usability factors and do not
provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical cal-
culations of a larger password space. Furthermore, they did
not evaluate their approach against a shoulder-surfing threat
model.
Bianchi et al. [3–6] proposed several authentication ap-
proaches based on tactile feedback with an emphasis on ac-
cessibility and multi-modal feedback. In comparison to our
approach, they rely on a tactile wheel to interact with the
system, a component which is not available in off-the-shelf
devices.
To make smartphone authentication resilient to shoulder
surfers, De Luca et al. [15, 17] presented an authentication
mechanism that allows users to enter passwords at the front
and the back of their device. While their approach offers
benefits with respect to shoulder-surfing resilience, a major
limitation of this approach is that there is no such device
available at this time that provides users a touch-sensitive
back.
Harbach et al. [19] performed a real-world study on smart-
phone unlocking and found that users spend a significant
amount of phone usage time on unlocking their device with
PINs and unlock patterns. On average, their study partici-
pants unlocked their phones about 47 times throughout the
day. This finding shows that mobile device unlocking intro-
duces a severe task overhead and highlights that authenti-
cation time is an important factor regarding the usability
of the method. It also implies that any time-consuming
method is potentially disadvantageous for usability and will
therefore have difficulties in getting accepted by users. De
Luca et al. [14] found that increased authentication time was
a reason for Android users to stop using Face Unlock (called
Trusted Face in later Android versions). Their study also re-
vealed that usability factors are the primary reason keeping
users from adopting biometric authentication on mobile de-
vices and that privacy and trust issues only play a secondary
role.
A new trending topic in authentication research is implicit
authentication. E.g., Buschek et al. [10] studied the feasi-
bility of mobile keystroke biometrics and found that they
can be used for user authentication with relatively low error
rates. As shown by Khan et al. [22], current methods for im-
plicit authentication are not capable of replacing knowledge-
based authentication because their real-world accuracy is
significantly lower than in lab settings. Furthermore, they
require a certain number of interactions to classify a user
correctly. Therefore, these systems are often perceived as
disruptive in cases where authentication fails and fallback
authentication methods come into play.
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3. CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES
Our approach is based on PIN-based authentication and
pressure-sensitive touchscreens as found in modern smart-
phones (e. g., 3D Touch available in the iPhone 6s). In the
following, we first describe the attacker model and then dis-
cuss the design and implementation of force-PIN.
3.1 Attacker Model
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that the
attacker is able to perform a shoulder-surfing attack: she
is in close vicinity to the user while authentication takes
place and can observe the typing behavior (e.g., in a crowded
public or semi-public environment). The key element of a
successful shoulder-surfing attack is the ability to clearly ob-
serve all sensitive information being entered on the touch-
screen.
We also assume that an attacker can gain possession of
the user’s device. In case the device gets lost or stolen, the
design of force-PIN makes a PIN harder to guess due to the
theoretically larger PIN space and the pressure component.
3.2 Force-PIN Design
Force-PINs are designed to be more resistant to observa-
tion due to the unobtrusive pressure component that helps
to obfuscate PIN components and thereby complements reg-
ular PIN entry: a user enters a digit either via a shallow or
deep pressure on a pressure-sensitive touchscreen. The user
receives tactile feedback when entering a digit with deep
force. The tactile component and vibration feedback may
implicitly help users to memorize force-PINs [9].
An example force-PIN could be 0-9-7-1 where bold and
underlined numbers should be pressed more deeply than oth-
ers on a pressure-sensitive touchscreen (see also Figure 1).
The design is not only simple, it is also cheap and easy to
deploy as it relies on off-the-shelf hardware. We expect that
users who are already using pressure-sensitive touchscreens
will find force-PINs as easy to learn as digit-only PINs as
they are based on interactions they are already familiar with.
3.3 Implementation
For our study, we implemented a prototype app for iPhones
with touch-sensitive screens. The app lets users set a force-
PIN and presents a lock screen that looks just like a common
lock screen from off-the-shelf iPhones. A force-PIN consists
of four digits and a force pattern with two different pressure
levels, namely shallow and deep press.
The design decision was based on a small pre-study with
9 participants where we evaluated subjective perceptions on
different types of pressure encodings. We evaluated both
relative and absolute differences in pressure with different
thresholds, respectively. As two-stage pressure with a con-
stant threshold for shallow and deep press performed best;
we implemented the prototype app accordingly. We also
tested different thresholds and to our surprise it was often
not easy to distinguish which threshold was higher and which
one was lower. Therefore, we then set the threshold for deep
pressure to 50% or more of the maximum possible pressure
supported by the hardware.
For our user study, we also implemented apps for four-
digit-only and six-digit-only PINs for a comparative lab study
and a slightly modified force-PIN app for our field study.
The app for the field study had a different main screen and
allowed users to submit additional comments to gather in-
situ data. Furthermore, the app issued a daily notification
to remind the participants of the study task. Each app
stored the entered PINs and measured authentication time
and failed attempts. The apps with force-PINs also stored
the selected four-digit force pattern and arrays of force gra-
dients that were measured for every touch interaction with
a pressure-sensitive digit button.
4. LAB STUDY
In the course of a usability lab study, we evaluated force-
PINs against digit-only four-digit and six-digit PINs. We
chose to evaluate four-digit standard and force-PINs against
six-digit standard PINs as they were introduced as the new
default in iOS 9. We did not evaluate six-digit force-PINs
as we wanted to minimize the additional task overhead. In
this section, we describe the methodology and results of this
lab study.
4.1 Design and Procedure
Our study is based on a within-subjects design, i.e., every
participant is exposed to all conditions. This allows us to
perform a comparative evaluation of all subjects exposed to
our conditions. We assigned every participant a unique ID
and a random order of conditions to reduce learning effects.
The three conditions were as follows:
• (C1) four-digit PINs
• (C2) six-digit PINs
• (C3) four-digit force-PINs with shallow and deep pres-
sure
We recruited participants around the university campus
over bulletin boards and personal communication mention-
ing that the study was about their preference of different
types of PINs. All of our participants were either employed
or currently enrolled as students at the university. We re-
cruited 50 participants for our lab study. They were compen-
sated with a voucher for the university’s cafeteria. Table 1
shows the demographics of our participants. All partici-
pants were frequent smartphone users and had used digit-
only PINs before. To reduce the risk of biased interpreta-
tion, we presented the three PIN entry methods equally and
did not provide any hints on which method was potentially
more secure or not. The participants were not told that the
study placed an emphasis on evaluating force-PINs.
The lab sessions proceeded as follows: First, the partici-
pants were briefed about the purpose of the study. A subse-
quent training session allowed them to get familiar with the
different types of PINs. This was necessary to minimize the
bias introduced by the comparison between a well-known
and well-trained authentication method and a newly intro-
duced scheme that users have not yet been exposed to.
Then the participants chose a PIN of the first assigned
PIN type and afterwards authenticated with the respective
PIN until they had completed three successful authentica-
tion sessions. After completing this task, the participant
proceeded to the next condition, selected a new PIN and
authenticated three times. We instructed the participants
to select PINs that they thought were as secure as possible
and asked them to remember the PINs just like their own
ones in real life. We refrained from assigning PINs as it is
a common scenario in the smartphone ecosystem that users
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can choose their own PINs. For the same reason, we did not
explicitly disallow PIN-reuse.
The metrics we used for our usability evaluation were au-
thentication speed and error rate as defined by De Luca et
al. [15]. They defined authentication speed as the time be-
tween the first touch and the last touch of the authentication
session and only counted successful authentication attempts.
Regarding the error rate, we differentiate between basic and
critical errors (as also proposed by De Luca et al. [15]) where
basic errors refer to errors within an overall successful au-
thentication session (failed attempts) and critical errors refer
to completely failed authentication sessions. Hence, success-
ful authentication sessions may contain failed attempts that
influence authentication speed.
In addition to the data collected through our smartphone
apps, we gathered quantitative and qualitative data via a
questionnaire consisting of 15 closed and open-ended ques-
tions to study the perceived security and usability of the
three different types of passcodes. The reason why we chose
to use open-ended questions was that we wanted to collect
meaningful participant statements using their own knowl-
edge, perceptions and interpretations. The questions can be
found in Appendix A. After completing the experiments, all
participants filled out the questionnaire on a laptop provided
by the experimenters.
The participants had to provide their previously assigned
experiment ID on the first page of the questionnaire to link
the data sets. Except for age, gender and whether the partic-
ipant had an IT background, no personal data was collected
in order to preserve the participants’ anonymity. We also
collected data on smartphone usage and asked the partici-
pants which authentication method they were using at that
time on their own smartphones.
The qualitative responses were coded using an iterative
coding approach. Two researchers independently went trough
the participant responses and produced an initial set of codes.
Then, the researchers discussed reoccurring codes, topics
and themes, and agreed on a final set of codes. Based on
this set, one researcher coded the answer segments for fur-
ther analysis. As most answers where short and to the point,
we did not perform a reliability test of the final coding.
4.2 Results
Given our sample consisting of 50 participants, the quan-
titative results of our study are based on 3 ∗ 3 ∗ 50 = 450
authentication sessions (three conditions, every pin type was
entered three times by 50 participants). Our study has
a repeated-measures design, i.e., every participant was ex-
posed to every condition. Therefore, we analyzed our data
with repeated measures ANOVAs. We removed 2 authen-
tication sessions that lasted longer than 30 seconds from
the dataset as those occurred when participants where dis-
tracted from the study task.
4.2.1 Authentication Overhead
Authentication Speed.
As proposed by De Luca et al. [15], we measured authen-
tication speed from the first to the last touch of a successful
authentication session. Hence, an authentication session can
also contain a maximum of two failed attempts. After the
third failed attempt, the user was locked out of the app.
Table 1: Participant characteristics from the lab study.
n=50
Demographic Number Percent
Gender
Male 31 62%
Female 19 38%
Decline to answer 0 0%
Age
Min. 19
Max. 56
Median 25
IT Background
Yes 4 8%
No 46 92%
Smartphone
Android 32 64%
iPhone 14 28%
Windows Phone 2 4%
Other 2 4%
Used Authentication Method
4-digit PIN 26 52%
6-digit PIN 2 4%
Password (digits/characters) 3 6%
Unlock Pattern 14 28%
Fingerprint Sensor 7 14%
Face Recognition 0 0%
Android Smartlock 1 2%
None 5 10%
The participants had to start the sessions by clicking on a
button.
We only considered successful authentication sessions to
measure authentication speed. As every user entered every
PIN type three times, we calculated the average authentica-
tion speed for every user and every authentication method
and used this value for further analysis. Overall, 56 force-
PINs were selected by our participants. Five of them decided
to change their PIN during the experiments, one participant
renewed the PIN twice. The participants did not mention
any reasons for these decisions. The authentication time
was measured based on the most recently selected PIN. Ta-
ble 2 shows the mean authentication time in seconds and er-
ror rate. Figure 2 shows the collected authentication speed
measures for all participants and PIN types.
To reveal significant effects regarding authentication speed,
we performed a one-way repeated-measures omnibus ANOVA
across the 3 PIN types. The results show significant differ-
ences in authentication time (F2,147 = 10.19, p < 0.001).
A pairwise t-test with with t0.95,98 = 1.9845 revealed sig-
nificant main effects comparing the authentication speed of
four-digit with six-digit PINs (p < 0042). In addition, au-
thentication speed of four-digit PINs was significantly faster
than of force-PINs (p < 0.001). The difference in authenti-
cation speed between six-digit and force-PINs was not sta-
tistically significant (p = 0.12).
Errors.
An important factor when estimating the overhead of an
authentication method is the number of errors. Similar to
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Table 2: Mean authentication time in seconds and error rate
with different levels of the independent variables.
Authentication Speed Mean SD
4-digit 2.34 1.21
6-digit 3.33 1.56
Force 3.66 1.96
Error Rate Basic Critical
4-digit 21 0
6-digit 22 0
Force 36 4
Figure 2: Mean authentication time per participant.
De Luca et al. [15], we distinguished between basic and crit-
ical errors. For our authentication scenario, we defined a
basic error as an erroneous attempt to enter a PIN code.
An authentication session can be successful overall, but may
take a user two or three times to enter the PIN correctly.
We considered an error as critical if the entire authentica-
tion failed, i.e., a user was locked out after three erroneous
attempts as commonly deployed in off-the-shelf smartphone
operating systems.
Out of 450 total authentication sessions, four authenti-
cation sessions failed (0.9%). All failed sessions involved
force-PINs. 36 (8.0%) failed attempts (basic errors) were
registered with force-PINs. 22 (4.8%) failed attempts were
registered with six-digit PINs and 21 (4.6%) with four-digit
PINs.
4.2.2 Perceived Usability and Security
As explained above, participants were asked to fill out a
short questionnaire after completing the PIN selection and
authentication tasks. In addition to the measurements col-
lected via our iPhone apps, we were interested in partici-
pants’ perceptions of the three suggested PIN types regard-
ing usability and security. We presented users with closed-
ended questions asking which PIN type they thought was the
easiest/hardest to remember, fastest/slowest and most/least
error-prone to enter and generally most/least secure. The
results of these questions are shown in Figure 3.
91% of our participants reported that they thought four-
digit PINs were the least secure of the three tested PIN
types. 95% also thought that four-digit PINs were the fastest
PIN type to enter and 80% thought that they were the eas-
iest to remember. 62% thought that force-PINs were the
most secure of the three methods but 55% also thought that
this was the most time-consuming PIN type to enter. In
Figure 3: Self-reported usability and security estimation in
percent.
comparison, only 31% thought that six-digit PINs were the
most secure but 75% also thought that they were the hardest
to remember.
To our surprise, all participants chose the “I don’t know”
option regarding most and least errors when entering any of
the suggested PIN types.
On the last page of the online survey, we asked partici-
pants three open-ended questions related to their perception
of force-PINs. This was the only part of our study where
force-PINs received particular attention. These questions
were asked at the very end of our lab sessions to minimize
the risk of biased interpretation.
After coding the data segments collected through these
questions, we found that 38 of the 50 participants thought
that a major benefit of force-PINs was the resistance against
observation due the haptic and invisible component. 10 par-
ticipants also stated that they think force patterns are eas-
ier to remember than additional digits, as would be the case
with longer PINs. Eighteen participants reported that they
still think that it requires additional effort to enter digits
with different levels of force as they are still not used to this
new interaction method with touchscreens.
4.2.3 Informal Participant Statements
In this section, we present informal participant statements
and also quote some of the qualitative statements gathered
via the open-ended questions from our post-experiment sur-
vey. These direct quotes are presented as they were given
by the participants prior to coding.
Overall, we were surprised by how easy it was to recruit
participants irrespective of the promised reward. We had
the impression that all of them found the topic of PIN se-
curity important. Based on their comments, we had the
impression that most of them seemed to be aware of the
richness of private data stored on their smartphones. Most
participants also asked for further help in protecting their
devices after participating in our study. After their partici-
pation, they were given the opportunity to have their ques-
tions answered by the experimenters. Even though a few au-
thentication sessions with force-PINs failed, all participants
understood the concept of force-PINs and were able to use
them. To our surprise, the participants found the concept
natural and intuitive even though most of them were using
pressure-sensitive touchscreens for the first time.
• ”I like the additional dimension. It is invisible and
therefore makes my PIN more secure.” (P5)
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Figure 4: Measured force relative to the maximum possible
force. The green line at y = 0.5 represents the threshold for
distinguishing between deep and shallow presses. The grey
lines at 0.25 and 0.75 indicate two potential thresholds for
a three-step force scale (e.g., shallow -medium-deep.)
• ”If someone observes me entering my PIN, which is
not that secure and probably easy to guess, at least the
force component is harder to guess. (P28)”
• ”I think it might take a while to fully get used to it, as
this concept is new to me. (P23)”
• ”Why not use a six-digit force-PIN? (P12)”
4.2.4 Force Pressure
As stated in Section 3, we based our design for a two-step
scale on our pre-testing with people who had never used
3D Touch before. Due to the low experience with pressure-
sensitive screens, they could not easily distinguish different
thresholds to separate deep and shallow press. The app also
provided vibration feedback as soon as the user entered a
digit with force. Through our lab study, we collected the ex-
act values of the force registered by the device and then used
it to evaluate how close or far the registered force was from
the threshold and the upper and lower boundaries. Figure 4
shows the force intensities of all logged force-PIN digits dur-
ing the lab study in percent of the maximum possible force.
5. SECURITY EVALUATION
Based on the data collected during the lab study, we per-
formed an additional security evaluation to evaluate shoulder-
surfing resistance and PIN entropy.
5.1 Shoulder Surfing
To evaluate our approach to the attacker model, we per-
formed a small shoulder-surfing experiment in the lab. Sim-
ilar to the study design of De Luca et al. [15] and von
Zeschwitz et al. [26], the attacker tried to shoulder surf the
force-PIN entry from the victim. For our evaluation, we
considered direct observation, i.e., the attacker was physi-
cally standing behind the victim and tried to guess the en-
tered force-PIN and then performed an additional evaluation
based on separately recorded video material. Our evaluation
is based on the 50 force-PINs which were collected in the
course of our lab study and then used for our evaluation of
authentication speed and error-rate.
The direct observation attack was performed during the
lab study. One experimenter acted as a shoulder surfer and
was in close proximity to the victim. Our participants were
aware of their entered PINs being tracked via the device
used during the experiments but they were not told that
one of the experimenters acted as a shoulder surfer. The
shoulder-surfing experimenter was perceived as trustworthy.
Therefore, the participants did not apply additional mea-
sures to prevent their PINs from being observed. We chose
this experimental setting as we believe that situations where
victims are not aware of being observed are the most dan-
gerous. We furthermore believe that any authentication
method should be resilient to direct observation regardless
of a specific situation and the user’s awareness. In addition,
an experimenter entered the collected PINs with their cor-
responding force patterns while being filmed. Each PIN was
entered only once. Another two volunteers, who were uni-
versity students (one male, one female), then tried to guess
the force-PINs based on the recorded material. Each of them
tried to guess 25 PINs. They were allowed to re-watch the
video sequence up to 5 times if they wanted to.
This first look at shoulder-surfing resistance suggests that
force-PINs are capable of making digit PINs more resilient
against shoulder-surfing attacks. Out of the 50 entered force-
PINs, the shoulder surfer was not able to guess a single
one completely. However, 21 out of 50 PINs were partially
guessed (i.e., the attacker correctly guessed the digits but
not the force pattern). Similar to the direct observation at-
tacks, the attackers in the camera-based attacks were not
able to completely guess the force-PINs from the recorded
material, but managed to guess 39 of the shown digit se-
quences correctly. We did not evaluate whether individual
digits (with or without force) were guessed correctly.
5.2 Entropy
In theory, the PIN space of four-digit force-PINs is larger
than for standard four-digit and smaller than six-digit PINs.
In our lab study, we used user-assigned PINs. We gave par-
ticipants a password policy, namely to choose a PIN that,
in their opinion, is as secure yet as memorable as possible
and where at least one digit within the four digit pattern is
entered with a deep press.
Obviously, the number of possible combinations is 104 =
10, 000 for four digit passwords and 106 = 1, 000, 000 for six
digit passwords. Force-PINs augment the four-digit pass-
word space to 204 = 160, 000 possible PIN codes including
four-digit PINs with all digits entered with shallow pressure.
As we defined a policy for the lab study which forced par-
ticipants to choose at least one digit with deep pressure, the
password space decreases to 150, 000.
As done by Cherapau et al. [12], we calculate the zero-
order entropy, which is a theoretical measure of the entire
search space of all possible secrets of a given length and
the size of a given alphabet assuming that each character is
selected randomly. Zero-order entropy is measured in bits
and calculated as L ∗ log2N , where L is the length of the
secret and N the size of the character set. Hence, for force-
PINs, the length is 4 and the character set 20. Thus, the
zero-order entropy for force-PINs is 17.28 bits, while four-
digit PINs have a zero-order entropy of 13.28 [12] and six-
digit PINs 19.93 bits. These theoretical measures are upper
bounds for real-world entropy.
In theory, the augmented PIN space is a major improve-
ment compared to standard four-digit PINs. In practice
however, users often do not fully exploit this benefit but se-
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lect PIN codes and passwords from a much smaller subset
that are often easy to predict [21]. Therefore, the search
space is smaller and the PIN is therefore easier for an at-
tacker to guess. We therefore evaluate the distribution of
force patterns and digit-pressure combinations.
Table 3 shows the occurrences of force patterns selected
by our participants. Our results suggest that more than half
of our participants selected a force pattern where only a sin-
gle digit is entered with deep press. In our sample, the most
popular positions in the digit sequence were the first and sec-
ond one with a probability of 14.0%. Even though this trend
indicates that our participants did not fully make use of the
theoretically larger PIN space and therefore create lower en-
tropy PINs in practice, this is already an improvement over
standard four-digit PINs. Our dataset of 56 PINs is rel-
atively small and therefore not sufficient to determine the
practical entropy of force-PINs. To provide a rough indica-
tor, we calculate the entropy of the binary force component
based on the force-PINs chosen by our study participants.
Furthermore, to estimate the entropy gain over digit-only
PINs, we compare our results to those from a related study
on iPhone passcodes with a larger sample size. In theory,
if force patterns were evenly distributed, the theoretical en-
tropy gain would be 4 bits. We calculate the practical en-
tropy gain as −∑ni=1 pi ∗ log2(pi) where pi is the probability
of a certain pattern occurring. Based on our observed prob-
abilities from 56 user-chosen force patterns (as presented in
Table 3), the practical entropy gain is 3.41 bits. Bonneau et
al. [7] calculated the entropy of four-digit PINs from iPhone
users as 11.42 based on a dataset of 204,508 PINs. Compar-
ing our findings with Bonneau et al. [7], an additional binary
force component provides an entropy gain of approximately
23% to digit-only PINs of length 4.
Table 3: Force patterns selected by the lab study partici-
pants where S = shallow press, D = deep press. n = 56
user-selected PINs. The table is sorted in descending order.
The pattern SSSS was excluded as the PIN selection policy
required participants to enter at least one digit with deep
press.
Force Pattern Number Percent
DSSS 8 14.0%
SDSS 8 14.0%
SSSD 7 12.2%
SSDS 6 10.5%
DSSD 6 10.5%
SDDS 5 8.7%
DDDD 5 8.7%
SSDD 4 7.0%
SDDD 2 3.5%
SDSD 2 3.5%
DDSS 1 1.7%
DSDS 1 1.7%
DDSD 1 1.7%
DDDS 0 0.0%
DSDD 0 0.0%
6. FIELD STUDY
In addition to the lab study, we conducted a field study
to show that authentication time for four-digit force-PINs
Table 4: Digits and their occurrence entered with either
shallow or deep press. Deep pressed digits are in bold; sorted
in descending order.
Digit (shallow/deep press) Number
1 (shallow) 27
0 (shallow) 22
5 (shallow) 16
4 (shallow) 15
3 (shallow) 14
2 (shallow) 12
0 (deep) 12
1 (deep) 12
6 (shallow) 11
2 (deep) 10
9 (deep) 10
3 (deep) 9
6 (deep) 9
9 (shallow) 8
4 (deep) 7
7 (shallow) 6
7 (deep) 6
8 (deep) 6
5 (deep) 6
8 (shallow) 5
decreases with training. The latter is an important met-
ric when comparing the usability performance of digit-only
PINs with force-PINs as we assume that users will initially
perform better with digit-only PINs as they are already
trained to use them.
6.1 Study Design and Procedure
We recruited 10 participants and deployed an iOS app
on their personal devices and asked them to enter as many
force-PINs as possible (we required a minimum of 300 suc-
cessful authentication sessions) over a period of two weeks.
At the end of this period, we conducted short debriefing in-
terviews with the participants. In contrast to the lab study,
the participants were aware that the focus of the study was
to evaluate force-PINs.
Due to the low propagation of compatible iPhones in our
region, we were able to recruit only 10 participants. In spite
of the relatively low number of participants, we still believe
that the gathered data provides useful insights and rough
indicators on learning effects. Furthermore, deploying force-
PINs in a real-world environment helped us to gather in-situ
reactions on authentication problems with force-PINs.
We based our study design on findings from Harbach et
al. [19], who found that users unlock their phone on average
47.8 times a day (about three unlocks per hour assuming a
user is awake for 16 hours per day).
Due to the restrictions in iOS, we were not able to re-
place the actual PIN scheme on the participants’ devices
with force-PINs. We also had to reject our plan to issue
notifications based on the participants’ unlocking behavior
as iOS does not offer to activate third-party apps after an
unlock event. Therefore, we were not able to collect the
respective data from the users’ own devices. As everyday
routines and smartphone usage habits are highly diverse,
we refrained from requiring force PIN entries at fixed time-
points throughout the day and opted for a more realistic and
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Figure 5: Authentication time development based on the
first 300 successful authentication sessions across all partic-
ipants.
less disruptive setting. To evaluate different timing options
for notifications, we conducted a small pilot study with dif-
ferent notification patterns. The participants from this pilot
study perceived the notifications as disruptive and annoying
regardless of whether they were issued at fixed or adaptive
time points. Based on the participants’ responses, we de-
cided to reduce the number of daily notifications to a sin-
gle daily reminder at an arbitrary point in time and left it
up to the participants when and how often to entered their
force-PINs. We are confident that this study design reflects
realistic usage habits and reduced the risk of participants
dropping out early from the study.
We instructed our participants to enter force-PINs when-
ever they took out their phone before or after their primary
task. We suggested they distribute the PIN entries over the
given period of time (i.e., about 20 PINs a day), but also told
them that it was their own decision when exactly and how
often to enter them. The participants were also instructed
to choose as secure and memorable PINs as possible with at
least one digit entered with force.
The main screen of our app had a button that redirected
the participants to a lock screen to start an authentication
session with a force-PIN. It was designed to look exactly like
the standard iPhone lock screen. Our app also displayed a
counter of successful authentication sessions and provided
users with two extra buttons, one to send us an e-mail in
case of questions and another one to leave a comment to a
situation. We also provided users with an option on the main
screen to set a new force-PIN. Upon clicking on this button,
a password-forgotten event was logged and the participants
were able to set a new force-PIN.
6.2 Results
Overall, our participants successfully completed 3,748 au-
thentication sessions with force-PINs. The results are sum-
marized in Table 5. Among the successful sessions, 254 failed
attempts (basic errors) were registered and five participants
had entirely failed authentication sessions (critical errors).
The number of critical errors (i.e., failed authentication ses-
sions) was low. The entirely failed authentication sessions
were registered at the very beginning of the study. The error
rates in Table 5 are given in percent of authentication ses-
sions completed by the user. For the quantitative analysis,
we removed authentication sessions that lasted longer than
30 seconds from our sample. As observed in our lab study,
0.00
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Figure 6: Error rate development (basic errors) based on the
first 300 successful authentication sessions across all partic-
ipants.
authentication sessions longer than 30 seconds usually oc-
curred when the participant was interrupted or distracted
from the study task.
The mean authentication speed over all authentication
sessions was 2.69 seconds (median=2.26, SD=0.59), which
is an improvement over the results from the lab study. The
shortest authentication session was only 1.02 seconds long.
In comparison, Harbach et al. [18] determined the average
authentication speed for digit-only PINs as 1.9 seconds.
All participants attended the debriefing session and par-
ticipated in the debriefing interviews. One participant did
not complete the initially requested 300 successful authenti-
cation sessions and had only 210 completed authentication
sessions. Although this did not meet our desired goal, we
included the data and conducted the debriefing interview
with the participant as the number of participants was low.
Just like in the lab study, we measured the authentication
time of each session as time from the first touch until the
user was successfully authenticated (including potentially
unsuccessful attempts made during the session). As per the
study design, we expected the PIN entries to be unevenly
distributed over time across the participants. Our results
show that the participants did not make use of the given
time and completed the study task in a few days regardless
of our daily notifications. Five participants completed their
authentication sessions on a single day. They distributed
their PIN entries over the morning, late afternoon and the
evening of that day. Four participants completed the study
task in two or three days and entered their PINs mostly in
the morning and late afternoon/evening of these days. One
participant spent four days on the study task and distributed
the PIN entries over various times of the day. We therefore
refrain from a time-based analysis and compare the results
based on authentication sessions.
For our analysis of authentication time and error rate, we
consider the first 300 successfully completed authentication
sessions from all participants. In order to visualize a trend
over multiple completed authentication sessions, we grouped
the results in bins of 50 sessions across all participants. We
selected a bin size of 50 to approximate the average num-
ber of phone unlocks per day as determined by Harbach et
al. [19]. We believe that this is a good way to simulate a
trend over a reasonable period of time. Figure 5 provides a
comparison of the average authentication time grouped by
50 successful authentication sessions based on the median
8
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Table 5: Summary of field study results. n=10
Subjects L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10
Completed Authentication Sessions 534 336 453 387 407 335 210 386 343 357
Basic Errors 13 41 69 20 4 26 16 17 21 27
Basic Error Rate 2.4% 12.2% 15.2% 5.2% 0.9% 7.7% 7.6% 4.4% 6.1% 7.6%
Critical Errors 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Critical Error Rate 0% 0.8% 0% 0% 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0%
Forgot Force-Pin 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Force-Pins 5225 0229 1234 5795 5968 0000 1703 0171 2204 9999
- 0229 7412 - - - - - -
- 1397 - - - - - - - -
authentication time per participant. These results suggest
that the authentication time decreases with training. Fig-
ure 6 shows that the error rate also decreases with training.
6.3 Debriefing Interviews
During the debriefing sessions, we asked the participants
in which situations they used force-PINs and whether they
found them feasible in these scenarios. According to the par-
ticipants, most force-PINs where entered either while they
were at home, in their office, or on public transport. Eight
participants reported that they found force-PINs a good way
to protect their digit PINs from shoulder surfers even though
they estimated their susceptibility towards direct observers
as relatively low. Three participants said that they would
like to use force-PINs to make their existing PINs more se-
cure against close intruders such as family and friends who
could easily guess their PIN as it was an important date.
According to them, the risk of a close acquaintance spying
on their phones was higher than that of shoulder surfing
attacks in public spaces.
Nine participants reported that their perceived authenti-
cation time decreased with training when they used it several
times a day. However, five of them reported that they still
think that simple digit PINs are faster for authentication.
All participants reported that they did not find force-PINs
harder to remember than simple digit PINs.
Participants were also asked if they would prefer to use
force-PINs over simple digit PINs. All of them said that they
generally liked the idea of an additional invisible component
and six participants said that they would maybe use them if
deployed on their device. Eight participants reported that
they found the training phase in the beginning annoying.
Three expressed interest in multiple-step pressure difference.
7. DISCUSSION
Previous research [19] has shown that the task overhead
of smartphone authentication is relatively high. Therefore,
we argue that the overhead of a technology to replace simple
digit PINs should not be higher than the state of the art.
The results from our lab study suggest that the task over-
head of force-PINs is initially higher than for digit-only four-
and six-digit PINs. Our security analysis and the partici-
pants’ responses indicate that force-PINs can increase PIN
entropy and improve the resilience towards shoulder-surfing
attacks. The results from our field study revealed learning
effects after a certain number of interactions with the invis-
ible component, and indicate that authentication time and
error rate decrease with training and converge towards the
metrics for four-digit PINs.
We collected evidence on frequently used force patterns
and determined a practical entropy gain of 3.41 bits based
on the force-PINs chosen by our study participants. Simi-
lar to other user-chosen secrets, the practical entropy does
not meet the theoretical measures but still suggests a ma-
jor improvement when compared to entropy estimations of
digit-only PINs.
Apart from the metrics we used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the respective PIN types, the self-reported data
from our participants suggests that force-PINs were per-
ceived as more secure than six-digit PINs. The open-ended
survey questions revealed that this was mainly due to the
force component, which our participants perceived as a good
countermeasure against observation.
Only two participants forgot and renewed their force-PINs
from the field study. The number of critical errors was also
low.
Hence, our results suggest that our scheme is able to im-
prove security with a reasonably low impact on task over-
head. In comparison to other solutions, our design improves
security without requiring the user to memorize longer se-
quences of digits, which have been shown to be more difficult
to remember [20].
To our surprise, none of the 50 participants provided an
estimation of which of the PIN schemes was most/least error
prone. While our collected data does not explain reasons, we
believe that this is because of the manifold sources of errors:
As authentication sessions in the wild usually take place in
diverse situations, their successful completion is influenced
by environmental and situational constraints beyond the de-
sign of the authentication method.
According to a study by Harbach et al. [19], users are
generally aware of risky situations but this does not influence
their general opinion about this threat, which is that this risk
is only considered in a low number of everyday situations.
However, just because users do not perceive situations as
risky does not mean that they are not. Hence, physically
shielding the PIN from an observer can only mitigate an
attack if the user is aware of the threat and therefore actively
taking precautions. Our results suggest that force-PINs can
help to protect users from shoulder surfers regardless of their
risk awareness, while minimizing the additional effort the
user has to invest.
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Modern smartphones offer biometric authentication as an
alternative. While supporters of these methods often argue
that they are harder to replicate and therefore not suscepti-
ble to shoulder surfing, it is commonly acknowledged by the
scientific community that these methods are non-revocable
and can easily be broken [1, 11]. Furthermore, they still
rely on passwords for fallback authentication. These ex-
amples highlight that it is worth putting effort into making
knowledge-based authentication resilient to shoulder surfing.
Our prototype app was implemented for iPhone 6s. Other
smartphone models, such as the Huawei Mate S, also have
pressure-sensitive screens and are therefore suitable for force-
PINs. Furthermore, force patterns like in force-PINs can
also be added to character/digit passwords with variable
length and Android unlock patterns to make them resilient
to shoulder surfing attacks. As future work and as soon as
a compatible API and device are available in our region,
we plan to evaluate force patterns in combination with un-
lock patterns and other alternative authentication schemes,
respectively.
8. LIMITATIONS
We now discuss limitations of our methodology and the
conducted studies.
As we recruited our participants at the university cam-
pus, the level of education and technology affinity among
our sample were higher than expected from the general pop-
ulation. As the results might differ for other demographics,
our results cannot be generalized to the entire population
of smartphone users. Since only 28% of the participants
in the lab study were iPhone users, we cannot determine
whether the measurements based on their input were bi-
ased by the lack of practice. However, as this study had a
repeated-measures design, we were able to perform a com-
parative evaluation of all subjects exposed to our conditions.
All participants in our field study took part with their own
devices and had therefore been exposed to a force-sensitive
screen before and were already familiar with the iOS user
interface and lock screen, respectively.
It is possible that users would improve even more over a
longer period of time and usability metrics converge to those
of four-digit standard PINs. Regardless of our suggestion to
distribute the authentication sessions over the two weeks,
the participants tried to complete the study task as fast as
possible and therefore entered all force-PINs within the first
three days. Also, the number of successful authentication
sessions varies widely across the participants. As the par-
ticipants did not spread out the PIN entries over the given
time, we can neither perform a time-based evaluation nor
seriously evaluate memorability. The fact that our partici-
pants from the lab study thought that force-PINs are more
memorable speaks for the system but does not obviate the
need for a future long-term evaluation. Regardless of these
limitations, we are confident that our study design reflects
real-world usage behavior and due to its flexibility ensured
that participants would not drop out early.
A major limitation of this work is that the participants
from both the field study and the shoulder surfing exper-
iment participated voluntarily and did not receive a com-
pensation for their participation. Therefore, the motivation
for the shoulder surfers was rather low to actually break the
system. Another limitation is that they were new to the
concept of force-PINs and therefore perceived the task as
particularly challenging. Also, force-PINs do not provide
visual feedback and the vibration for digits entered with
force is very subtle and therefore not audible on the video
material. The participants reported finding it hard to focus
on both the digits and the force patterns. The person who
entered the PINs in front of the camera was a faculty mem-
ber who was aware of the hypothesis being tested just like
the experimenter who tried to shoulder surf the PINs from
the lab study. These limitations imply that further inves-
tigation is needed to determine a lower bound for shoulder
surfing resistance.
9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Our university does not have an ethics board but has a
set of guidelines that we followed in our research. A fun-
damental requirement of these guidelines is to preserve the
participants’ privacy and to limit the collection of person-
related data as far as possible. For both our studies, we did
not collect any personally identifiable information, except
for age and gender. A major ethical challenge was the col-
lection of PINs. The PINs were chosen by the participants
and they were aware that the PINs they selected were being
collected. However, we cannot preclude that those were real
PINs. Keeping this data confidential and making it impos-
sible to map a physical person with a certain PIN was there-
fore our primary concern. In similar shoulder surfing studies,
participants were re-corded with video cameras to perform
attacks based on the recorded material. Although this was
our initially planned study setting, we decided not to film
the participants directly while they entered their PINs. This
decision was made based on the results and feedback from
our pilot study, where our participants expressed discomfort
about being filmed while entering information as sensitive as
a PIN. We therefore chose to let a separate person enter all
force-PINs in front of a camera and then used the resulting
material for our camera attacks.
10. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed integrating pressure-sensitive
touchscreen interactions into knowledge-based authentica-
tion. These force-PINs enhance digit-only PINs with a force
pattern, i. e., an additional pressure-sensitive component that
allows users to select higher entropy PINs that are harder
for a shoulder surfer to observe.
We were able to collect evidence on the security benefits
of force-PINs and their impact on usability. We conducted
a lab study with 50 participants and showed that authen-
tication speed of force-PINs is not significantly slower than
that of six-digit standard PINs, but still significantly slower
than that of 4-digit standard PINs. We also showed that
the error rate is rather low in spite of the fact that most
participants had not yet been exposed to pressure-sensitive
touchscreen interaction. Furthermore, we conducted a small
shoulder-surfing study where an attacker tried to observe
and guess force-PINs. The attackers were not able to guess
a full force-PIN consisting of a digit sequence and a force
component. These results suggest that force-PINs can help
to mitigate shoulder-surfing attacks in public spaces that
are potentially noisy and crowded. In a security evaluation
of the collected force-PINs, we showed that the practical
entropy is still higher than for standard four-digit PINs al-
though users do not make full use of the larger PIN space. In
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an additional field study with 10 participants, we deployed
force-PINs in the wild and showed that users improve after
being exposed to the technology over a longer period of time.
Our results imply that small enhancements such as an
additional pressure component allow users to select higher
entropy PINs that are more resilient to shoulder-surfing at-
tacks, while keeping the impact on usability metrics such as
authentication speed and error rate low. This is important
as users enter their PINs multiple times a day and therefore
require methods that do not increase the task overhead.
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APPENDIX
A. LAB STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
The following questions were answered by the participants
of the lab study after they used the three different types of
PINs in a randomized order (four-digit/six-digit/force-PIN).
Demographics.
1. What was your ID during the lab experiments?
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Are you studying IT security or are you working in an
IT security-related field? (yes/no)
5. What kind of smartphone are you currently using? (single-
choice: iPhone, Android, Windows Phone, Other, I
don’t use a smartphone)
6. What methods are you currently using to unlock your
smartphone? (multiple-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-digit
PINs, character and digit password, unlock pattern, fin-
gerprint sensor, Android Smartlock, none)
Estimated security and usability of the three PIN types.
1. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
most secure? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-digit PINs,
force-PINs, I don’t know)
2. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
easiest to remember? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-
digit PINs, force-PINs, I don’t know)
3. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
least secure? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-digit PINs,
force-PINs, I don’t know)
4. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
most time-consuming? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-
digit PINs, force-PINs, I don’t know)
5. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
hardest to remember? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-
digit PINs, force-PINs, I don’t know)
6. Which of the three PIN methods do you think is the
least time-consuming? (single-choice: 4-digit PINs, 6-
digit PINs, force-PINs, I don’t know)
Open-ended questions.
1. What did you like about force-PINs?
2. What did you NOT like about force-PINs?
3. Can you think of a situation where force-PINs would
be particularly useful?
B. FIELD STUDYDEBRIEFING INTERVIEWS
1. Where did you use force-PINs?
2. What did you like about force-PINs?
3. What did you NOT like about force-PINs?
4. Can you think of a situation where force-PINs were
particularly useful?
5. Can you think of a situation where force-PINs were
annoying?
6. Is there anything else you would like to let us know?
C. STUDY APPS
The following screenshots show the user interface of the
apps used for the lab and field study. Figure 7a and Fig-
ure 7b were used to evaluate force-PINs in the lab study. The
apps for the other two conditions had the same layout but
evaluated four-digit and six-digit PINs, respectively. Fig-
ure 7c shows the main screen of the app used in the field
study.
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(a) Main screen of the lab study app. (b) Lock screen of both the lab study and
field study app.
(c) Main screen of the field study app.
Figure 7: Screenshots of the study force-PIN apps.
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